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Abstract 
After the fall of communism in the late ’80 in Central and Eastern Europe, due to the appearance of several 
political  parties  in  each  state,  there  was  the  need  to  form  coalitions  in  order  to  provide  support  for  the 
governments.  
This paper aims to identify the institutional features that influence the coalition formation process using the 
rational choice institutionalism approach. In this case, the political parties, who seek to optimize their benefits in 
the  government  formation  process,  are  constrained  by  the  institutional  environment.  The  institutional 
environment comprises the rules that determine how the governments are formed. Particularly, this paper aim is 
to identify how the cabinet operating rules affect the outcomes of the coalition formation process.  
In order to do so, I will develop a quantitative analysis of 110 cabinets in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Czech  Republic,  Slovakia,  Hungary,  Slovenia,  Romania  and  Bulgaria  formed  after  the  first  free  elections 
subsequent to the communist fall until the beginning of 2010. These countries represent the post-communist 
states that joined the European Union, finalizing the democratization process at least from a formal point a 
view.
This  cross-country  comparison  tries  to  explain  how  some  institutional  features  influence  the  formation  of 
coalitions in new democracies. This research is valuable due to the lack of this type of comparative studies on 
Central and Eastern European states. 
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I. Introduction  
The classical theories on coalition formation were trying to explain the best formula that a 
coalition must have in order to form governments. Thus, Riker, Axelrod or De Swan had in mind 
different assumptions about parties’ motivations regarding government formation and built models 
like minimal-winning coalition, minimal connected coalition or minimal policy distance in order to 
explain the best formulae of the coalitions. The problem with this kind of models is that they offer a 
large set of viable coalitions that there were not suitable for predictions.  
  Once the institutionalist theories regarding coalition formation were developed this type of 
problem was no longer present. The institutional approach tries to explain the social outcomes not 
only taking into consideration agent’s preferences and the optimizing behavior, but also taking into 
consideration the institutional environment that will optimize human actions in achieving their goals 
and it will shape the agent’s behavior.
1 These theories have as main subject of study the rational 
agent, like the rational choice theory, but in the case of the institutional approach, the agents’ actions 
are constrained by institutions.  
In the case of the coalition formation process, the rational agents are the political parties that 
seek to optimize their benefits in the government formation process and the institutions are the 
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constrains imposed to the parties by the formal or informal rules characterizing a particular party 
system. In an article from 1994, Kaare Strøm, Michael Laver and Ian Budge identified five types of 
institutions that influence the coalition formation process: the ones that affect the cabinet formation, 
the ones concerning cabinets operating rules, the ones concerning the legislative rules, the  ones 
concerning parties’ politics of coalition and the ones concerning external veto players
2.
In this paper I shall analyze the way that cabinet operating rules as institutions affect coalition 
formation in ten states in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to do so, I develop a quantitative data 
analysis on the coalition formed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.  
Although there are a number of case-studies on coalition formation in the states from Central 
and Eastern Europe area, there are not many cross-country comparisons on this area.  
II. Cabinets operating rules in Central and Eastern Europe
Cabinets  operating  rules  as  constraints  that  affect  coalition  formation  refers  mainly  to 
decision-making rules within the cabinet. Their source stays within the doctrine of collective cabinet 
responsibility. “There are three key elements of collective responsibility, which concerns the Cabinet 
as  an  entity.  The  confidence  element  requires  that  the  Cabinet  must  have  the  confidence  of 
Parliament  to  remain  in  office,  and  must  resign  if  it  loses  a  vote  of  confidence.  […]  The 
confidentiality  element requires  that  the  proceedings  of,  and  advice  to,  the  Cabinet  shall  be 
confidential. […] The unanimity element requires all members of the Cabinet shall publicly support 
the decisions of the Cabinet or resign.”
3 In the states where this doctrine is powerful there are better 
chances  to  form  coalitions  that  include  parties  with  close  ideological  positions.  Instead,  if  this 
doctrine is weak the parties with strong preferences concerning public policies are not likely to 
become partners into a governmental coalition.  
Thus, we have states where cabinet decision making is treated collectively and states where 
ministers responsibility is individual.  
The effects of different cabinet operating rules can be noticed at the level of cabinet party 
composition,  but  also,  in  the  way  that  different  actors  may  influence  decision-making  process 
concerning a certain bill. Thus, John Huber and Nolan McCarty (2001) draft two models of how 
different cabinet operating rules work. First of all, the authors assume the Prime-Minister’s power to 
act unilaterally in demanding the Parliaments vote of confidence and, secondly, the necessity of the 
Prime-Ministers  to  obtain  cabinet  collective  approval  before  demanding  Parliaments’  vote  of 
confidence.
Huber and  McCarty,  in developing their two formal models,  take into consideration  two 
different  examples  of  cases  concerning  operating  rules.  First,  they  take  into  consideration  the 
example of Norway, where the Prime-Minister “can act unilaterally to make a vote on a particular 
policy a vote on the continued existence of a government. In such systems, if members of parliament 
adopt or threaten to adopt a bill that the prime-minister does not like s/he can make his or her 
preferred policy a question of confidence.  This forces the parliament either to accept the prime 
ministers policy or to bring the government down.”
4
On the other hand, in order to develop their second model the authors take as an example 
Netherlands where the decision of demanding a vote of confidence from the Parliament stands within 
the collective approval of the cabinet. “In such countries, if the partners in government withhold 
2  Strøm,  Kaare,  Ian  Budge  and  Michael  Laver,  “Constraints  on  Cabinet  Formation  in  Parliamentary 
Democracy”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, no. 2 (May 1994): 308-321.
3 Palmer, Matthew, “Toward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining Ministerial 
Responsibility”, The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, Vol. 11, no. 1 (1995), 172  
4  Huber  John  and  Nolan  McCarty,  “Cabinet  Decision  Rules  and  Political  Uncertainty  in  Parliamentary 
Bargaining”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, no. 2, (2001), 3461727
approval, the prime minister cannot make the final policy a confidence issue. Instead, either s/he 
must resign (if s/he does not support the policy) or the bill proposed in parliament is voted against the 
status quo, and a defeat results in maintenance of the status quo (but not government failure)”
5. Thus, 
in systems like the one in Netherlands, the problem of choosing a strategy stands mostly with the 
coalition partners than with the prime minister, accordingly with their position on a certain bill.  
The formal models proposed by the authors assume the interactions between two players, the 
prime-minister  P  and  the  coalition  partner  C,  which  is  a  pivotal  member  of  the  governmental 
majority. In the unilateral model (where the prime minister can ask for a vote of confidence without 
cabinet approval), in the initial stage the coalition partner proposes a bill which takes effect if P does 
not invoke a vote of confidence. The prime minister may react at the proposal of the bill by the 
coalition partner in of three ways: (1) he can accept it (end of the game with the bill as an outcome), 
(2) he can resign (end of the game, with the maintenance of the status quo as an outcome) or (3) he 
may invoke unilaterally a vote of confidence for the proposal of any other bill. If the prime-minister 
uses the vote of confidence, then the coalition partner may either accept or reject the bill proposed by 
P. If C accepts the bill proposed by P, than the outcome will be the bill proposed by P. If C rejects 
the bill proposed by P, the government must resign and the outcome will be the maintenance of the 
status quo
6.
With regard to the ‘collective cabinet’ (where the Prime-Minister must obtain the cabinet 
approval in order to invoke a vote of confidence), the game begins with the proposal of a bill by the 
coalition partner. The prime minister may (1) accept this bill or (2) make a motion in the cabinet that 
another bill preferred by him be treated as a question of confidence. If P makes the motion, than C 
will have to decide whether to approve it or to reject it in the cabinet. If C accepts the motion than the 
outcome will be the bill proposed by P. If C rejects the motion, the prime-minister may allow either 
for the bill proposed by C to be debated in the Parliament or to resign, the outcome being the 
maintenance of the status quo
7.
The  models  formulated  by  Huber  and  McCarty  have  implications  on  the  government 
termination and also on coalition formation. Concerning the latter, the models particularly refer to the 
prime  ministers  party  identity.  According  to  Lieven  de  Winter,  the  outcomes  of  the  coalition 
formation process are the party composition of the government, the prime ministers party identity, 
the general orientation of the government’s policy-making agenda, the allocation of the ministerial 
portfolios and competences between the parties in the coalition and the identity of the actors that will 
be given these portfolios
8. Thus, “if the prime-ministers have significantly more power to influence 
policy outcomes under unilateral cabinet decision rules, then the costs to the governing coalition of 
selecting a prime-minister with extreme preferences will be significantly greater in unilateral than 
collective systems.”
9
The  number  of  studies  concerning  the  way  cabinet  operating  rules  influence  coalition 
formation is generally low
10. The main reason for this is represented by the fact that the constitutions 
of the states do not specify a certain type of rules concerning the way that a cabinet must make a 
decision and so, is assumed that once the cabinet it is formed it will act as an unitary actor. As Huber 
and  McCarty  demonstrated,  the  individual  or  collective  action  of  the  cabinet’s  members  may 
influence both the government termination and the coalition formation.  
5 Huber and McCarty, Cabinet Decision Rules…, 346-347 
6 Huber and McCarty, Cabinet Decision Rules…, 347 
7 Huber and McCarty, Cabinet Decision Rules…, 347-348 
8 De Winter, Lieven, “The role of Parliament in government formation and resignation” in Parliaments and 
Majority Rule in Western Europe, edited by Herbert Doring, (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), 116 
9 Huber and McCarty, Cabinet Decision Rules…, 353 
10 Müller, Wolfgang C., Torjbörn Bergman and Kaare Strom, “Coalition Theory and Cabinet Governance: An 
Introduction” in Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe, edited by Kaare 
Strom, Müller, Wolfgang C. and Torjbörn Bergman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 1728  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
Regarding the way cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe operate, the Constitutions of the 
states in this area are reserved concerning this problem. In order to identify cabinets operating rules 
in this area I have taken into account the constitutional provisions regarding the way that the cabinet 
functions.
The constitutions of Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia are reserved 
concerning this problem. Thus, these constitutions only refer to the type of governmental acts that 
may  be  adopted,  without  mentioning  the  internal  procedure  of  the  cabinet
11.  Concerning  the 
constitutions  of  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Czech  Republic  and  Slovakia,  it  is  explicitly  mentioned  the 
necessity of obtaining a majority inside the cabinet for all the acts of the government.
12
Thus, we can distinguish between cabinets operating rules taking into consideration the way 
the decisions are made inside the cabinet. In the cases where the decisions may be made unilaterally 
by the prime-minister, we shall consider that the cabinets operating rules are individual, while in the 
cases where decision-making inside the cabinet assumes its collective approval – obtained through 
voting – we shall consider that the cabinets operating rules are collective. In table 1 we can observe 
the operating rules of the cabinet in the ten states studied.  
Table 1  
Cabinets operating rule 
Individual  Collective 
Romania  
Bulgaria 
Poland
Estonia
Slovenia
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania
Czech Republic 
Slovakia
III. Research design and data collection  
In this study I will analyze how the cabinets operating rules as institutions affect coalition 
formation in ten states in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to do so, I shall develop a quantitative 
data  analysis  on  the  coalition  formed  in  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Czech  Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.  
I will do so in order to verify the hypothesis developed by Strøm et.al according to which in 
the states where cabinets operating rules assume the collective action of the cabinet members the 
coalitions that are formed will include parties ideologically close to each other, while in the states 
11  According  to  Article  108  of  the  Romanian  Constitution  available  on-line  at  http://www.cdep ro/ 
pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_2&par1=3#t3c3s0a107 accesed on March 1st 2011, Articles 108 and 115 of the Bulgarian 
Constitution available on-line at http://www.parliament.bg/en/const accesed on March 1st 2011, According to Article 
160 of the Constitution of Poland available on-line at http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1 htm accesed 
on  March  1st  2011,  According  to  Article  96  of  the  Estonian  Constitution  available  on-line  at  http://www.servat. 
unibe.ch/icl/en00000_ html  accesed  on  March  1st  2011,  According  to  Article  117  of  the  Slovenian  Constitution 
available on-line at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/si00000_ html accesed on March 1st 2011, According to Article 
39/A of the Hungarian Constitution available on-line at pe http://www.lectlaw.com/files/int05 htm accesed on March 
1st 2011 
12  According  to  Article  61  of  the  Latvian  Constitution  available  on-line  at  http://www.servat.unibe.ch/ 
icl/lg00000_ html,  accesed  on  March  1st  2011,  Article  95  of  the  Lithuanian  Constitution  available  on-line  at 
http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution htm accesed on March 1st 2011, Article 76 of the Czech Constitution 
available  on-line  at  http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ez00000_ html,  accesed  on  March  1st  2011,  Article  118  of  the 
Lithuanian Constitution  available  on-line at  pe http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/lo00000_.html accesed on March 1st 
2011,1729
where cabinets operating rules assume the individual action of the cabinet members the coalitions 
that are formed will include parties ideologically distant to each other.  
Thus, I shall consider as independent variable the type of cabinet operating rule and as a 
dependent variable the type of coalition formed in each state. Concerning the independent variable, I 
shall note with 1 the states where cabinets operating rules assume the individual action of the cabinet 
members and with 2 the states where cabinets operating rules assume the collective action of the 
cabinet members. Concerning the type of coalition, they can be either compact, noted with, 1 and 
distant, noted with 2.
In order to establish the type of coalition, I shall use as an index the ideological distance 
between the most distant parties from the government. In order to estimate the latter, I shall use the 
‘Rile’ (Right-Left) score of the governmental parties using the formula: 
DGP= |GPH – GPl|
where DGP represents the ideological distance between the governmental parties, GPH represents the 
governmental party with the highest Rile score or, other way said, the Right-est governmental party 
and GPl represents the governmental party with the lowest Rile score or other way said, the Left-est 
governmental party.  
  In order to establish parties’ ideological positions on the Left-Right scale, there one of these 
methods can be used: expert surveys, mass surveys and content analysis of parties’ manifestos. The 
first two types of methods represent indirect sources of data regarding to the ideological positions of 
the parties. The content analysis of parties’ manifestos is a direct one because is focused on parties’ 
documents.
13 The Rile Score used in this study is established by using this last method. In this paper, 
I shall use the data provided by “Comparative Manifestos Project” (CMP) for the period 1990-2009.  
  This method assumes the division of the text into phrases or sentence that have policy 
content  and that  are named  coding-units.  These coding-units  are assigned  to a  particular  policy 
domain and policy category included into a predetermined coding scheme. Once the coding-units are 
included in the coding scheme, their number is standardized taking as bases their total number. 
Afterwards, they are transformed in percentages and so their sum will always be 100%
14. (Grecu, 
2008: 124). 
  The method of establishing the Rile index used at CMP was developed in 1992 by Michael 
Laver and Ian Budge. They developed a factor analysis of the seven index variables, public policy 
areas in the scheme of categories, including 28 points of reference units or coding units. From this 
analysis two factors were extracted corresponding to the distinction between Left and Right. All of 
the reference units or index variables were corresponding to either factor of the "Left" or factor 
"Right", were included in this scale. The final scale was constructed by subtracting the size of "Left" 
in size "Right"
15
  Concerning the data collection, I used the Constitutions of the studied states in order to 
identify the type of cabinets operating rules.  
  I have used the study by Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Sona N. Golder
16 in order to identify 
the coalitions formed in the states taken into consideration in this study after the fall of communism 
until 2008 and official websites states for coalitions studied by early 2010. I corroborated these data 
13 Grecu, R zvan, “Party Competition in Central and Eastern Europe: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Romania”, (Phd Thesis, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, 2008), 124 
14 Grecu, “Party Competition in..., 124 
15 Dinas, Einas and Kostas Gemenis, “Measuring parties’ ideological positions with manifesto data – A critical 
evaluation  on  the  competing  methods”,  Party  Politics,  OnlineFirst,  published  on  December  3,  2009  as 
doi:10.1177/1354068809343107, 3 
16  Ryals Conrad,  Courtney and  Sona N. Golder  “Measuring government duration and stability  in Central 
Eastern European democracies”, European Journal of Political Research, 49.1730  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
with  the  one  existing  in  the  database  ParlGov.  I  excluded  from  this  research  the  caretaker 
governments, single party majority  governments and single party minority  governments because 
cabinets operating rules as institutional constraints cannot be considered in their context. The types of 
coalition  considered  in  this  research  are:  minority  coalitions,  minimal  winning  coalitions  and 
oversized coalitions. 
  Regarding  the  index,  I  used  the  Rile  scores  of  the  governmental  party  from  the 
„Comparative  Manifestos  Project”  database  and  I  calculated  the  ideological  distance  of  the 
governmental parties according to the formula mentioned above.  
I.IV. Results 
In this paper I analyzed 92 governments formed by coalitions in the ten studied states. They 
are found in table 2 where there are also mentioned cabinets operating rules.  
Table 2  
State Types  of  cabinet  operating 
rules 
Number of cabinets 
Bulgaria  1  3 
Czech Republic  2 8
Estonia  1  8 
Hungary  1  7 
Latvia  2  17 
Lithuania  2  7 
Poland  1  13 
Romania  1  11 
Slovakia  2  9 
Slovenia  1  9 
Total  92 
  Thus, there are 54,3% (50 cabinets) from the studied cases that formed in states where 
cabinet operating rules assume the unilateral action of the Prime Minister and 42,7% (42 cabinets) 
from the studied cases that formed in states where cabinet operating rules assume cabinets collective 
approval.
  Concerning the index used, the ideological distance between the most distant parties from 
the government, the 92 cases group themselves between 1,51 (the Slovakian governments lead by 
Vladimir  Merciar  between  12.01.1993-18.03.1993  and  17.11.1993-14.03.1994)  and  75,67  (the 
Slovene government lead by Janez Drnovsek between 12.01.1993-29.03.1994). The mean of the 
ideological distances of the governmental parties is 21,17, while the median value in 17,79. 
  In  order  to  do  the  division  between  the  ideological  compact  coalitions and  ideological 
distant coalition I took into consideration the average between the most extreme values of the index 
used, this value being 38,59. Thus all the coalitions whose value of the ideological distance between 
the most apart parties in the government is between 1,51 and 38,59 will be considered ideological 
compact coalitions and those whose value is between 38,59 and 75,67 will be considered ideological 
distant coalitions. We can observe their frequency in table 3.  1731
Table 3  
State Types of cabinet 
operating rules 
Types of coalition  Total  Compact  Distant 
Bulgaria  1  3  0  3 
Czech Republic  2  6 2 8
Estonia  1  8  0  8 
Hungary  1  7  0  7 
Latvia  2  14  3  17 
Lithuania  2  7  0  7 
Poland  1  10  3  13 
Romania  1  11  0  11 
Slovakia  2  9  0  9 
Slovenia  1  5  4  9 
Total  80  12  92 
From the total of 92 studied cases, 87% (80 cabinets) fall within the category of ideologically 
compact  coalitions  and  only  13%  of  studied  cases  (12  cabinets)  fall  within  the  category  of 
ideologically distant coalitions. 
From the 80 cabinets that fall within the category of ideologically compact coalitions 55% (44 
cabinets) are coalitions that formed in states where cabinet operating rules assume the unilateral 
action of the Prime Minister and 45% (36 cabinets) are coalitions that formed in states where cabinet 
operating rules assume cabinets collective approval. Regarding the 12 cabinets that fall within the 
category of ideologically distant coalitions the proportion is equal between the two types of coalitions 
taken into consideration. 
From the total of 50 cabinets that formed in the states where cabinets operating rules assume 
the unilateral action of the Prime Minister, 88% (44 cabinets) are ideologically compact coalitions 
while only 12% (6 cabinets) are coalitions that include ideologically distant parties. From the total of 
42 cabinets that formed in states where cabinets operating rules assume the collective action of the 
cabinet  approximately  85%  (36  cabinets)  are  ideologically  compact  coalitions  and  only 
approximately 15% (6 cabinets) are ideologically distant coalitions.  
The results of the quantitative data analysis confirms the hypothesis of Strom, Budge and 
Laver concerning the formation of compact coalitions in systems with collective cabinets operating 
rules, but not the part concerning the formation of coalitions in systems with cabinets operating rules 
that assume the unilateral action of the Prime Minister. 
In order to verify this statement I correlated the two variables with regard to cabinet operating 
rule and the type of coalition. The results are found in table 4. 
Table 4  
Cabinets 
operating
rules
Type of 
coalitions
Cabinets operating 
rules
Pearson Correlation  1 ,034 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,749 
N 92  92 
Type of coalitions  Pearson Correlation  ,034  1
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,749 
N 92  92 1732  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
Thus, it can be observed that the intensity between the two variables is very low, given the 
fact that the Pearson coefficient rather tends to 0. On the other hand, the fact that the value of the 
significance test of the correlation coefficient exceeds 0,1 demonstrates the fact that there is not a 
strong correlation between those two variables.  
V. Concluding remarks 
In this paper I analyzed how institutional constraints like cabinets operating rules influence 
coalition  formation  in  ten  states  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  In  order  to  do  so,  I  took  into 
consideration if the cabinet’s members must approve Prime Minister’s decisions in order to validate 
them or the Prime Minister can make decisions unilateral regarding the whole cabinet. 
The analysis contains 92 cabinets that were formed through coalitions from Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. In this 
paper I verified if Strøm et al. hypothesis regarding cabinets operating rules applies on the studied 
cases.
Following the results of the quantitative data analysis we can invalidate the assumption that 
ideologically compact coalitions will rather form in countries where operating rules require Cabinets 
collective approval in the decision-making process, while the ideologically distant coalitions will 
rather form in states where cabinets operating rules require the Prime Minister's unilateral action in 
the  decision-making  process.  Moreover,  this  analysis  shows  that  in  the  studied  countries 
ideologically compact coalitions tend to form. 
  Following the correlation analysis between the two variables we can say that first of all the 
intensity between them is very low and, secondly that between them there is not a strong correlation. 
  Thus, we can conclude that on the set of studied systems, institutions like cabinets operating 
rules do not influence the coalition formation process.  
Appendix – Governmental parties ideological distance in Central and Eastern Europe 
1990-2010 
Prime-Minister  Parties into 
coalition 
Period  Ideological 
Distance
Simeon Sakskoburggotski  NDS, DPS  24.07.2001-
21.02.2005  18,72 
Simeon Sakskoburggotski  NDS, DPS, NPT  22.02.2005-
22.06.2005  18,72 
Sergei Stanishev  BSP, NDS, DPS  16.08.2005-
31.12.1998  21,10 
Vaclav Klaus  ODS,  KDU/CSL, 
ODA 
1.01.1993-
1.06.1996  37,39 
Vaclav Klaus  ODS,  KDU/CSL, 
ODA 
05.07.2010-
20.11.1997  17,72 
Vladimir Spidla  CSSD,  KDU/CSL, 
US
15.07.2002-
1.07.2004  16,89 
Stanislav Gross  CSSD,  KDU/CSL, 
US
4.08.2004-
30.03.2005  16,89 
Stanislav Gross  CSSD, US  31.03.2005-
25.04.2005  16,89 
Jiri Pariubek  CSSD,  KDU/CSL,  26.04.2005- 16,89 1733
US  2.06.2006 
Mirek Topolanek  ODS,KDU/CSL, 
SZ
9.01.2007-
15.03.2009  46,13 
Jan Fischer  ODS, CSSD  8.05.2009-  50,20 
Mart Laar  I, M, ERSP  21.10.1990-
26.09.1994  24,72 
Tiit Vähi  KMÜ, K  17.04.1995-
11.10.1995  21,01 
Tiit Vähi  KMÜ, RE  3.11.1995-
20.11.1996  6,98 
Mart Laar  I, RE, M  25.03.1999-
8.01.2002  32,39 
Siim Kallas  RE, K  28.01.2002-
2.03.2003  14,66 
Juhan Parts  ResP, RE, RL  9.04.2003-
24.03.2005  7,18 
Andrus Ansip  RE, K, RL  13.04.2005-
4.03.2007  4,60 
Andrus Ansip  RE, IRL, SDE  5.04.2007-  16,03 
Valdis Birkavs  LC, LZS  8.07.1993-
15.07.1994  11,45 
Maris Gailis  LC, TPA  15.09.1994-
1.10.1995  16,69 
Andris Skele 
DPS,  LC,  TB, 
LNNK/LZP,
LZS/LKDS/LLDP, 
LVP
21.12.1995-
20.01.1997  54,88 
Andris Skele 
DPS,  LC,  TB, 
LNNK/LZP,
LZS/LKDS/LLDP, 
LVP
13.02.1997-
28.07.1997  54,88 
Guntars Krasts 
TB/LNNK,  LC, 
DPS,
LZS/LKDS/LLDP 
7.08.1997-
8.04.1998  53,88 
Guntars Krasts  TB/LNNK,  LC, 
LZS,LKDS
9.04.1998-
3.10.1998  27,40 
Vilis Kristopans  LC, TB/LNNK, JP  26.11.1998-
3.02.1999  18,78 
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